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CASE NOTE: N V ROMANIA  
(APPLICATION NO. 59152/08, DECISION OF 28 NOVEMBER 2017) 
 




Is deprivation of liberty ever justified for reasons arising out of a person’s disability?  
Whilst there was a long-standing consensus in both international and regional human 
rights law that it could be, the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) in 2006 may radically have changed the picture, Article 
14(1)(b) CRPD providing that “the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a 
deprivation of liberty.”   
 
In N v Romania, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) addressed how it 
considered Article 5 ECHR is to be interpreted in light of Article 14 CRPD; the case also 
saw Strasbourg grappling with the question of what is to be done where a person no 
longer meets the criteria for detention but cannot be discharged because of a lack of 
adequate provision in the community.  This note discusses both that case and, in the 
concluding section, the subsequent decision of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in 




On 29 January 2001, following the publication of an article in the national press and 
a programme broadcast on a national television channel, the Romanian police initiated 
a criminal prosecution against the applicant, N. He was charged with incest and sexual 
corruption of his two under-age daughters, aged 15 and 16.  He was alleged to have 
had sexual intercourse with his elder daughter and forced both his daughters to be 
present while he was having sexual intercourse with his wife.  On April 2001, he was 
admitted to a psychiatric hospital, a forensic medical report prepared in November 
2001 finding that he suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and lack of 
discernment, and recommending putting in place a programme of compulsory medical 
treatment.  All but one of the criminal charges (that relating to sexual corruption) were 
not, ultimately, proceeded with by the prosecution, but in April 2002 Bucharest District 
Court No 6 upheld the medical detention order against him.  He remained detained in 
different psychiatric hospitals for the next 16 years.   
 
N’s position underwent a formal (if not a substantive) change in 2016, when, on the 
basis of forensic medical reports which determined that he did not pose a risk of 
danger to society, but that it was inconceivable that he could be released to be subject 
to treatment in the community absent social support, a court ordered that he continue 
to be detained in psychiatric hospital, pending transfer to a specialised institution 
capable of providing proper living conditions and treatment. A further forensic report 
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in 2017 recommended replacing the detention measure with a compulsory medical 
treatment order [in the community] in view of the applicant’s “low level of 
dangerousness (while on treatment), compliance with the rules, absence of incidents, 
[and] the lengthy period of supervision” (paragraph 70). This led to a further order 
for the replacement detention measure with a compulsory treatment order until the 
applicant had made a full recovery.   
 
Clearly out of desperation, the applicant then asked to remain in psychiatric hospital 
until his social situation had been settled.  As his lawyer noted in a further letter to 
the hospital, releasing N without adequate support “would condemn him to vagrancy, 
destitution and the deterioration of his physical and mental health” (paragraph 76).   
 
Nothing happened in terms of movement, and N took his case to Strasbourg, 
complaining that his detention was arbitrary and unjustified, and was based solely on 
his mental disability, which he claimed was contrary to the requirements of the Court’s 
case-law, to Article 14(1)(b) CRPD and to the decision of the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities in the complaint brought by Marlon James Noble against 
Australia.2  He further challenged the failures of the Romanian authorities (both 
judicial and administrative) to take appropriate steps to secure his release at the point 
where it became clear to them that the forensic medical evidence did not justify his 
continued detention.   
 
III. THE DECISION 
 
A. Article 5(1) 
 
As is now customary, the Strasbourg court did not merely cite the relevant domestic 
legislation (which made clear that a detention measure could only be imposed on a 
person if he poses a danger to society) but set out what it considered to be relevant 
provisions from other international documents.   The UN documents cited by the court 
were:  
 
(a) Articles 13, 14 and 19 of the UNCRPD and the Guidelines on Article 14 noted above; 
 
(b) The 2016 decision on the complaint of Marlon James against Australia, in which the CRPD 
Committee had held (at paragraph 8.7) that:[t]he author’s detention was […] decided on the 
basis of the assessment by the State party’s authorities of potential consequences of his 
intellectual disability, in the absence of any criminal conviction, thereby converting his disability 
into the core cause of his detention. The Committee therefore considers that the author’s 
detention amounted to a violation of article 14 (1) (b) of the Convention according to which “the 
existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty. 
 
(c) The report presented in July 2005 by the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health to the UN Commission on Human 
Right following his visit to Romania from 23 to 27 August 2004,3 and the report in April 2016 on 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty to the UN Human Rights Council on 
his mission to Romania from 2 to 11 November 2015,4 both of which spoke of concerns at the 
centralised and institutionalised model of mental health care.  
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The court set out what is now a standard ‘mantra’ in relation to deprivation of liberty 
for purposes of Article 5(1)(e).  This mantra has lengthened over time, to add not 
just the classic Winterwerp criteria,5 but also the observation that:  
145. … the detention of a mentally disordered person may be necessary not only where he 
needs therapy, medication or other clinical treatment to cure or alleviate his condition, but also 
where the person needs control and supervision to prevent him, for example, causing harm to 
himself or other persons (see Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, no. 50272/99, § 52, ECHR 
2003-IV, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 146, ECHR 2012). 
And the observation that:  
146. … in certain circumstances, the welfare of a person with mental disorders might be a further 
factor to take into account, in addition to medical evidence, in assessing whether it is necessary 
to place the person in an institution. However, the objective need for accommodation and social 
assistance must not automatically lead to the imposition of measures involving deprivation of 
liberty. The Court considers that any protective measure should reflect as far as possible the 
wishes of persons capable of expressing their will. Failure to seek their opinion could give rise 
to situations of abuse and hamper the exercise of the rights of vulnerable persons. Therefore, 
any measure taken without prior consultation of the interested person will as a rule require 
careful scrutiny (see Stanev, cited above, § 153).  
In N’s case, the court considered that the first Winterwerp criterion was clearly met, 
the “applicant having suffered from mental disorders confirmed by a whole series of 
forensic medical reports” (paragraph 149).  The real question was whether N’s illness: 
149. … was of a kind or degree warranting detention and whether, in the particular 
circumstances of the case relating to the findings of the latest forensic medical reports, the 
applicant’s detention had been extended validly. [149] 
B. Detention prior to 2016 
 
The Strasbourg court identified two distinct stages to the case.  Prior to the recognition 
by the domestic courts in 2016 that N should no longer be subject to psychiatric 
detention, the focus of Strasbourg’s attention was upon the thoroughness of the first 
periodic review of his detention in 2007, which occurred after the legislative 
amendments designed to consolidate the rights of persons with disabilities. This 
should have warranted:  
 
150. …an extremely thorough and complete examination ought to have been conducted in order 
to ascertain whether the applicant’s psychiatric disorder was of a kind and degree warranting 
detention.  
 
In fact, the ECtHR concluded, this had not happened, and the domestic court had 
failed to “conduct a thorough assessment of the aspect which was essential in deciding 
on the applicant’s detention, that is to say his dangerousness” (paragraph 155).  
Subsequent reviews were equally “formalistic and superficial,” nor did the responses 
to appeals lodged by N provide any kind of clarification (paragraph 156).   Finally, 
“neither the medical authorities nor the court itself considered whether any alternative 
                                               
5 I.e. that the person reliably be shown to be of unsound mind (on the basis of “objective medical 
expertise”); secondly, the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
confinement; thirdly, the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a 
disorder, following Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, at paragraph 39.  
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measures might have been implemented in the present case” (paragraph 157).  The 
Strasbourg court therefore had little hesitation in finding that, at least since 2007, the 
detention was contrary to the requirement in Romanian domestic law that a detention 
measure can only be imposed on a person if he poses a danger to society (paragraph 
158), devoid of any basis in law and hence contrary to Article 5(1)(e) (paragraph 161).  
 
In a passage to which I will return, the court also observed (at paragraph 159) that 
the detention was also open to question:  
[p]articularly in the light of the provisions of Article 14 § 1 (b) CRPD, which lays down that the 
existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.  
 
C. 2016 onwards  
 
As the court observed (at paragraph 162), the findings of the forensic medical reports 
in 2015: 
 
presented the medical officers with a psychiatric and deontological dilemma as regards the 
applicant’s possible release, given that the provisions of domestic law concerning detention 
measures required the detainee to pose a danger to society, which did not apply to the applicant.   
 
Referring back to previous case-law,6 the ECtHR observed (at paragraph 163) that it 
did not exclude the possibility that: 
 
the imposition of conditions could justify a deferral of a discharge found to be appropriate or 
feasible in domestic-law terms, it was of paramount importance that appropriate safeguards were 
in place so as to ensure that any continued detention was consonant with the purpose of Article 
5 § 1 of the Convention.  
 
In N’s case, the Strasbourg court noted (at paragraph 166) that his release had been 
ordered (provisionally) in 2016 and (definitively) in 2017:  
 
in line with practices which have become quite common at the international level in recent years, 
geared to promoting, as far as possible, treatment and care for persons with disabilities in the 
community (see Article 19 CRPD […] above, the Guidelines of the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities [on Article 14 CRPD] above, the Council of Europe’s Disability Strategy 
2017-2023 […] and, mutatis mutandis, W.D. v. Belgium, no. 73548/13, § 113, 6 September 
2016).   
 
However, the blunt fact remained that N had never actually been released, nor had 
any thorough assessment had been carried out to date of the applicant’s practical 
needs and the appropriate social protection measures. Furthermore, the action taken 
by the national authorities had been unproductive because of an internationally 
recognised lack of reception facilities in Romania.  
 
The ECtHR therefore held that N’s continued detention after 2016 was arbitrary for 
purposes of Article 5(1)(e) ECHR.   
 
                                               
6 Luberti v. Italy (23 February 1984, Series A no. 75); Johnson v. the United Kingdom (24 October 
1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII) and Kolanis v. the United Kingdom (no. 517/02, 
ECHR 2005-V).  
[2019] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
 
65  
D. Article 5(4)  
 
The court had little hesitation in finding that Article 5(4) had been breached in N’s 
case, on the basis of:  
 
(1) lengthy intervals between judicial determinations of the necessity of maintaining the 
applicant’s detention, which did not meet the “speediness” requirement set out in Article 5(4) 
ECHR;  
(2) the inadequacy of the legal assistance provided him.  The court noted that in the great 
majority of the hearings, the officially appointed lawyers either advocated the maintenance of 
the detention or left it to the discretion of the courts. The court professed not to be “dictating 
how a lawyer should approach cases in which he or she represents a person suffering from 
mental disorders” (paragraph 197), but it is clear that it took a dim view of the approach taken 




Unusually, the Strasbourg court set out individual measures required in order to 
execute its judgment, in particular that the authorities should immediately implement 
the 2017 judgment ordering N’s release under conditions consonant with his needs.  
Further, it noted that:  
the shortcomings identified in the present case are liable to give rise to further justified 
applications in the future. Accordingly, it recommends that the respondent State should 
envisage adopting the requisite general measures to ensure that the detention of individuals 
in psychiatric hospitals is lawful, justified and devoid of arbitrariness. Similarly, detainees 
should have access to a judicial appeal accompanied by appropriate safeguards ensuring a 
prompt decision on the lawfulness of the detention. 
IV. COMMENT 
 
A. Delayed discharge 
 
The problem of delayed discharge from psychiatric hospitals does not just bedevil 
countries such as Romania.  Whilst N v Romania does not represent a dramatic 
advance in the Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to this issue, it provides further 
confirmation that the state is on very thin legal ice when it seeks to rely upon its own 
failings to provide adequate services in the community to justify the continued 
detention of a person under Article 5(1)(e) once they no longer meet the domestic 
criteria for psychiatric detention.   
B. Deprivation of liberty – Article 5(1)(e) and the CRPD  
 
As noted at the outset, Article 14(1)(b) CRPD makes clear that “the existence of a 
disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.”  Precisely what this implies, 
however, is hotly contested.   
At the UN level, the UN Human Rights Committee (the treaty body for the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which includes its own right to liberty) and the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities have given differing 
interpretations of Article 14(1)(b).  Both Committees agree that deprivation of liberty 
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on the basis of disability alone is unlawful.7 However, the two Committees differ as to 
whether it is ever permissible to deprive a person of their liberty to secure against 
risks to them or other people said to arise from their mental health condition (i.e. their 
disability).   
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities takes the view, expressed in 
‘Guidelines’ in 2015 that “[t]he involuntary detention of persons with disabilities based 
on risk or dangerousness, alleged need of care or treatment or other reasons tied to 
impairment or health diagnosis is contrary to the right to liberty, and amounts to 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”8  Subsequent to the decision in N, this view was 
echoed – in even stronger terms – by a report published in 2018 by the UN Special 
Rapporteur for Persons with Disabilities, Catalina Devandas.9  
In General Comment No 35, the UN Human Rights Committee, conversely, expressed 
the view – which it sees as supported by Article 14(1)(b) CRPD – that “[t]he existence 
of a disability shall not in itself justify a deprivation of liberty but rather any deprivation 
of liberty must be necessary and proportionate, for the purpose of protecting the 
individual in question from serious harm or preventing injury to others,” and further 
that “[f]orced measures must be applied only as a measure of last resort and for the 
shortest appropriate period of time, and must be accompanied by adequate procedural 
and substantive safeguards established by law.”10  A similar view was taken by the 
UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (‘WGAD’) in the 
context of a complaint against Japan, 11  the Working Group noting that “it is contrary 
to the provisions of article 14 of the Convention to deprive a person of his or her 
liberty on the basis of disability,”12 and in relation to the specific facts of the detention 
of the individual in question that: 
46. […] neither at the time of his detention nor prior to that there is any evidence of Mr. N 
being violent or otherwise presenting a danger to himself and/or to others. His subsequent 
transfer to Tokyo Metropolitan Matsuzawa Hospital had no connection to the initial incident 
of attempted theft. It is therefore clear to the Working Group that the deprivation of liberty 
of Mr. N was carried out purely on the basis of his psychiatric disorder, and was thus 
discriminatory. The Working Group therefore concludes that Mr. N’s detention and his 
subsequent internment in Tokyo Metropolitan Matsuzawa Hospital and Koganei Hospital were 
discriminatory ….  (emphasis added)  
                                               
7 UN Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 35 (2014), on Article 9 - Liberty and security of 
person, para 19; UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2015: “Guidelines on Article 
14 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” para 6.   The differing views of relevant 
UN bodies as to involuntary detention and treatment are usefully summarised in Martin, W., & Gurbai, 
S.,‘Surveying the Geneva impasse: Coercive care and human rights,’ International journal of law and 
psychiatry, 2019: 64:117-128.  See also by way of overview Fennell, P.W.H. and Khaliq, U., ‘Conflicting 
or complementary obligations? The UN Disability Rights Convention, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and English law,’ European Human Rights Law Review, 2011:6:662-674 and Bartlett, 
P.,‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law,’ 
Modern Law Review, 2012:75:752–778.   
8 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2015: “Guidelines on Article 14 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” para 13.  
9 Ending the deprivation of liberty on the basis of disability, available at 
www.embracingdiversity.net/report/Deprivation%20of%20liberty%20of%20persons%20with%20disa
bilitie 1030 (accessed 31 October 2019).   
10 UN Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 35 (2014), on Article 9 - Liberty and security of 
person, para 19.  See also A/HRC/36/37, para. 55; opinion No. 68/2017. 
11 A/HRC/WGAD/2018/8; opinion No. 8/2018.   
12 Citing in a footnote the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment on Article 9.  
[2019] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
 
67  
What had not been entirely clear until N v Romania would be whether the 
disagreement in Geneva would be echoed at Council of Europe level.   
 
In 2016, in Hiller v Austria,13 the ECtHR had considered a 2014 statement by the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights14 predating but 
along very similar lines to the 2015 Guidelines from the Committee.  The court did not 
expressly engage with the statement, as the case in question did not concern Article 
5, but rather Article 2, in the context of a contention that the applicant’s son had been 
able to commit suicide as a result of the psychiatric hospital’s negligence.  It did, 
though, have it in mind when it came to dismissing the claim, noting (in a passage 
that should serve as a powerful antidote to the ‘risk aversion’ model of mental health 
law15):  
54 […] the hospital did not act negligently in allowing M.K. to take walks on his own once his 
mental state had improved after 2 April 2010. As evident from the international law sources 
pertaining to the issue [including the statement above] and as the Government has 
comprehensively argued, today’s paradigm in mental health care is to give persons with mental 
disabilities the greatest possible personal freedom in order to facilitate their re-integration into 
society. The Court considers that from a Convention point of view, it is not only permissible to 
grant hospitalised persons the maximum freedom of movement but also desirable in order to 
preserve as much as possible their dignity and their right to self-determination.  
The Council of Europe’s former Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, 
expressly endorsed the position of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in August 2017.16   
Only a very few months later, however (and – perhaps deliberately – making no 
reference to the Commissioner’s statement), the Strasbourg court in N v Romania 
confirmed that it interpreted Article 14(1)(b) CRPD in a different fashion.  From the 
passage at paragraph 159 cited above, it is clear that the court interpreted Article 
14(1)(b) CRPD in the same way as does the Human Rights Committee, as prohibiting 
deprivation of liberty solely on the basis of disability, but not excluding it as a 
necessary and proportionate response to secure a person of unsound mind against 
risk to self or others.   
At the start of 2019, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
returned to the subject in Rooman v Belgium17, making the position even clearer.  In 
this case, the central complaint under Article 5 was that the person detained on the 
basis of Article 5(1)(e) was not receiving appropriate treatment.  The Grand Chamber 
took the opportunity to “clarify and refine the principles in its case-law” relating to 
Article 5 so as to be able to take account of the particular circumstances in which an 
individual is placed in compulsory confinement.  The Grand Chamber considered that:  
205 […] in the light of the developments in its case-law and the current international standards 
which attach significant weight to the need to provide treatment for the mental health of persons 
in compulsory confinement ([referring to the CRPD, the Guidelines on Article 14 CPRD the 
Recommendation REC (2004) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning 
                                               
13 Application no. 1967/14, decision of 22 November 2016, [2018] MHLR 21. 
14 www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15183&LangID=E  (accessed 15 
January 2020).  
15 Which remains prevalent: see (in England and Wales): Rabone & Anor v Pennine Care NHS 
Foundation [2012] UKSC 2.  
16 https://www.coe.int/es/web/commissioner/-/respecting-the-human-rights-of-persons-with-
psychosocial-and-intellectual-disabilities-an-obligation-not-yet-fully-understood (August 2017, accessed 
15 January 2020).  
17 Application no. 18052/11, decision of 31 January 2019. 
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the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorders and explanatory 
memorandum (adopted on 22 September 2004)]), it is necessary to acknowledge expressly, in 
addition to the function of social protection, the therapeutic aspect of the aim referred to in 
Article 5 § 1 (e), and thus to recognise explicitly that there exists an obligation on the authorities 
to ensure appropriate and individualised therapy, based on the specific features of the 
compulsory confinement, such as the conditions of the detention regime, the treatment 
proposed or the duration of the detention. On the other hand, the Court considers that Article 
5, as currently interpreted, does not contain a prohibition on detention on the basis of 
impairment, in contrast to what is proposed by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in points 6-9 of its 2015 Guidelines concerning Article 14 of the CRPD. (emphasis 
added) 
 
The decisions in N and Rooman are hardly surprising, consonant as they are with the 
approach of member states to the ECHR.  By way of example, the Republic of Ireland, 
which waited until 2018 to ratify the CRPD, until it had passed legislation designed to 
bring it into compliance with its obligations,18 entered a declaration upon ratification 
of the CRPD – in full knowledge of the CRPD Committee’s Guidelines – to the effect 
that  
“it understand[s] that the Convention allows for compulsory care or treatment of persons, 
including measures to treat mental disorders, when circumstances render treatment of this kind 
necessary as a last resort, and the treatment is subject to legal safeguards.”   
The decisions in N and Rooman, though, means that the ‘impasse’ at UN level noted 
by the UN Special Rapporteur in 2017 on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health is therefore now 
replicated at Council of Europe level.19  The Grand Chamber in Rooman left the door 
open to a possible reinterpretation of Article 5 in due course by noting that it was 
proceeding on the basis of the “current” interpretation of the Article.  It is certainly 
possible to see how it could in due course move to interpret Article 5(1)(e) ECHR as 
justifying deprivation of liberty only where the person not only has a mental disorder 
but that mental disorder renders them functionally incapable of making decisions 
about their care and treatment.  However, not least because of the positive duty under 
Article 2 to secure the right to life of persons at real and immediate risk of suicide,20 
a duty which may – in extremis – need to be discharged by detaining the person,21 it 
is difficult to see how the impasse will ever be fully bridged in legal terms.22  Even a 
move to narrow the gap to those who are functionally incapable of decision-making 
at the relevant moment would not meet with the approval of the Committee who, to 
date, have challenged the validity of the concept of mental capacity.23  
                                               
18 In particular, the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015. 
19 See Dainius Pūras, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (2017) A/HRC/35/21, para 33. 
20 See most recently Fernandes de Oliviera v Portugal (Application 78103/14, decision of 31 January 2019).  
21 Although in Fernandes de Olivieira, the Grand Chamber recognised the balancing act in play here, 
reiterating “that the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. 
In this regard, the authorities must discharge their duties in a manner compatible with the rights and 
freedoms of the individual concerned and in such a way as to diminish the opportunities for self-harm, 
without infringing personal autonomy (see, mutatis mutandis , Mitić v. Serbia , no. 31963/08, § 47, 22 
January 2013). The Court has acknowledged that excessively restrictive measures may give rise to 
issues under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention (see Hiller [Application no. 1967/14, decision of 
22 November 2016] § 55).” (para 112).  
22 Although see, for possible ways forward, Martin, W., & Gurbai, S.,‘Surveying the Geneva impasse: 
Coercive care and human rights,’ International journal of law and psychiatry, 2019: 64:117-128.  
23 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014: “General Comment No. 1 on Article 
12: Equal recognition before the law.” CRPD/C/GC/1, para 14.  But it is possible that this is changing – 
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If the legal impasse is unbridgeable, this means that the pressure is all the greater to 
find solutions which reduce the relevance of this impasse in practical terms – i.e. by 
reducing the need to invoke the requirements of Article 5(1)(e) in Council of Europe 




                                               
the Concluding Observations on the second report of Australia (CRPD/C/AUS/CO/2-3, 15 October 2019) 
include a recommendation (at paragraph 24) that Australia adopt the recommendations set out in the 
Australian Law Reform Commission’s 2014 report, ‘Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth 
Laws’ (ALRC Report 124).  These recommendations are based, in part, upon a functional model of 
capacity.     
24 See, for instance, Gooding, P. et al, ‘Alternatives to Coercion in Mental Health Settings:  A Literature 
Review’ available at https://socialequity.unimelb.edu.au/news/latest/alternatives-to-coercion (accessed 
15 January 2020). 
